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THE ASSET DEPRECIATION RANGE (ADR) SYSTEM:
INEQUITY IN THE REVENUE ACT OF 1971
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Code authorizes an annual deduction for
depreciation in the taxpayer's computation of taxable income. 1 The de-
duction for exhaustion, wear and tear, and obsolescence represents the
amortization of the cost of property, i.e., the original investment in
property used in trade or business, or held for the production of in-
come.' In authorizing this deduction Congress indicated that " [d] epre-
elation allowances are the method by which the capital invested in an
asset is recovered tax-free over the years it is used in a business. The
annual deduction is computed by spreading the cost over its estimated
useful life."' Treasury Regulation 1.167 (a)-1 more technically defines
depreciation as
that amount which should be set aside for the taxable year in
accordance with a reasonably consistent plan (not necessarily
at a uniform rate), so that the aggregate of the amounts set
aside, plus the salvage value, will, at the end of the estimated
useful life of the depreciable property, equal the cost or other
basis of the property. . . .4
Accordingly, the sum total of depreciation deductions over the period
of years of an asset's useful life (that is, the depreciation reserve) may
not exceed the cost of the property as reduced by salvage value.
Congress empowered the Treasury Department to provide "all
needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the Internal Rev-
enue Code]. ..."6
 More specifically, the Code provides that the Secre-
tary of the Treasury may issue regulations with respect to the manner
of computing a "reasonable allowance" for depreciation.° Recently, in
an attempt to stimulate the sagging national economy, the Treasury
adopted regulations which place into effect a new system of determining
depreciation for machinery, equipment and other specific property.'
This system, called the Asset Depreciation Range (ADR) System, re-
1
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(a), provides:
(a) General rule.—There shall be allowed as a depreciation deduction a
reasonable allowance for the exhaustion, wear and tear (including a reasonable
allowance for obsolescence)--
(1) of property used in the trade or business, or
(2) of property held for the production of income.
2 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(a).
2 H.R. Rep. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1954).
4 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(a) (1964).
5 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7805(a).
6 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b).
'T Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11 (1971).
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ceived formal congressional approval in the newly enacted Revenue
Act of 1971.8
This comment will explain and examine the ADR System. The
analysis will proceed in four, steps. First, the background of the depre-
ciation law and Treasury regulation .
 will be set out, with emphasis on
the developments which led to formal legislative sanctioning of the
ADR System in the Revenue Act of 1971. Second, the mechanics of the
ADR System will be explained, particularly those sections which change
the prior law and regulations. Third; the economic effects of the ADR
System on business taxpayers will be examined. Finally, there will fol-
low a discussion of the underlying tax policy considerations upon which
ADR is based. The comment conclUdes that the ADR System is an
inequitable and inefficient means of effecting national economic policy.
I. THE REGULATORY BACKGROUND
Presently, the Internal Revenue Code allows the taxpayer to uti-
lize any reasonable method of depreciation so long as he uses it con-
sistently. Three methods, which result in differing rates, are specifically
approved" The first and simplest Method is "straight line deprecia-
tion!'" Here, the basis of the property, usually cost less estimated sal-
vage value," is spread evenly over the estimated useful life of the
property." The other two approved, methods are both accelerated de-
preciation procedures which allow larger deductions during the early
years of the asset's life." Whereas, under the straight line method, the
8
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(m)(1)..
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b).
10
 Int. Rev.' Code of 1954, § 167(b) (1).
11
 Section 1012 provides in general that! the basis of property shall be its original
cost to the taxpayer. This unadjusted basis is
 subsequently increased or decreased to
account for taxpayer's actions relating to such property. Capital improvements increase
the basis while allowable depreciation deductions reduce it. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §
1016.
12 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-1(a) (1956). For example, if an asset has an 8 year life,
then A or 12'4% of the cost or other basis, Iess salvage value, may be deducted from
income each taxable year.
18 The Revenue Act of 1954 provides for two specific means of accelerated deprecia-
tion. Under the first, the "declining balance" method (§ 167(b) (2)), the rate cannot
exceed twice that acceptable under the straight line system. Thus, if the acceptable
straight line rate is 12 14%, a rate of up to 25% is acceptable for the declining balance
method. Hence, a fixed or uniform rate is applied to a constantly declining adjusted basis.
Salvage value is not considered in this computation, but depreciation is not allowable
beyond the salvage value point. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-2(a) (1964). This method allows
"approximately 40 percent of an asset's cost to be depreciated in the first quarter of its
service life, and two-thirds in the first half of its life." B. Bittker, Federal Income Estate
and Gift Taxation 296 (3d ed. 1964). The other method of rapid depreciation specifically
allowed under §.167 is the "sum of the years-digits" method. Under this method a de-
preciation rate is applied to the unadjusted .basis reduced by salvage value. This rate
varies and is reduced as the taxpayer moves from the initial use of the property toward
the end of the asset's useful life. The rate kir any year is a fraction in which the de-
nominator is the sum of the digits representing the total years of estimated life of the
asset, and the numerator is the remaining years of useful life at the beginning of the tax
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depreciation deduction is the same for each taxable year, under an
accelerated method the deductions follow a constantly decreasing pat-
tern. Thus depreciation deductions are higher in the early years than
in later years, thereby effecting a deferral of tax liability."
Accelerated depreciation is based on the theory that new property
is generally capable of producing more revenue than old property.
Therefore, it is believed that a better matching of revenue and expenses
is achieved by permitting larger depreciation deductions in the early
period, when the property has its greatest usefulness. More practically,
however, accelerated depreciation is intended to encourage new invest-
ment." Such an incentive isi designed to stimulate capital formation
for economic growth and to encourage the modernization and the ex-
pansion of uses of equipment in order to improve the U.S. competitive
position abroad."
In addition to the method of depreciation selected, the total
amount of the annual depreciation deduction depends upon the "useful
life" of an asset. An understanding of the basic changes in Internal
Revenue Service policy in relation to the useful life concept is central
to a discussion of the ADR System. As generally defined by Regulation
1.167(a)-1(b),
[t] he estimated useful life of an asset is not necessarily the
useful life inherent in the asset but is the period over which
the asset may reasonably be expected to be useful to the tax-
payer in his trade or business or in the production of his in-
come. This period shall be determined by reference to his
experience with similar property taking into account present
conditions and probable future developments. Some of the
factors to be considered in determining this period are (1)
wear and tear and decay or decline from natural causes, (2)
the normal progress of the art, economic changes, inventions
and current developments within the industry and the tax-
payer's trade or business, (3) . . . conditions peculiar to the
year. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(b)-3 (1956). This method results in slightly less depreciation
in the early years of the asset's life than does the maximum double declining balance
method.
14 Because of the high level of income tax rates, the amount and pattern of deprecia-
tion deductions have an important effect on the cash position of a business. With an
income tax rate of approximately 50%, a method which results in, for example, a $20,000
greater depreciation deduction in any taxable year will reduce the cash requirements for
income taxes by $10,000. In other words, this allows cash to be recovered through the
depreciation process. T. Fiflis & H. Kripke, Accounting for Business Lawyers 229 (1971).
This is not a permanent saving since in later years the depreciation deductions are reduced
because depreciation deductions cannot exceed the asset's basis. Treas. keg. § 1.167(a)-
1(a) (1964). For new or expanding businesses this deferment of income taxes is attractive
since it permits an increase of cash on hand which may be used to purchase additional
equipment.
15
 B. Bittker, Federal Income Estate and Gift Taxation 296 (3d ed. 1964).
16 Id. at 296-99; see generally Torrey, Current Problems Involving the Investment
Credit, 1965 U. So. Cal. Tax Inst. 569.
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taxpayer's trade or business, and (4) the taxpayer's policy as
to repairs, renewals and replacements."
The initial method utilized by the Revenue Service to determine
useful life was an item-by-item approach based on statistical studies.
Bulletin F, issued by the Internal Revenue Service in 1920, set forth
useful lives for thousands of depreciable assets." Although updated on
occasion, by 1962 the bulletin had become obsolete, no longer ade-
quately representing useful lives.'° In 1962, Revenue Procedure 62-21 20
was issued with the intention of providing "more liberal depreciation
allowances as an incentive for economic growth and .. to provide more
objective standards for depreciation allowances in order to minimize
the areas of controversy." 21
 Procedure 62-21 set forth guideline lives
for about seventy-five broad classes of assets, which covered the ma-
jority of assets used in a trade or business. These lives were thirty to
forty percent shorter than those previously allowed by Bulletin F. 22
 It
was hoped that with a more rapid depreciation allowance taxpayers
would modernize their business operations by replacing old and out-
dated machinery and equipment with new, more efficient and tech-
nologically advanced facilities." Theoretical justification for the short-
ening of lives lay in the increased emphasis on obsolescence and
technological change as factors in estimating useful lives. This em-
phasis represented a shift in attitude toward useful life estimations,
which previously had been based primarily on retirement and replace-
ment policies."
The 1962 Guidelines, in abandoning the item-by-item approach,
grouped assets into heterogeneous classes. In determining these classes,
the Treasury considered common factors based on physical charac-
teristics." For example, "office equipment" included desks and chairs
as well as typewriters and calculating machines. This treatment was
mutually advantageous to both the taxpayer and the Treasury. Allow-
ing the taxpayer to combine assets in a single guideline class for tax
purposes simplified his depreciation computation and record keeping;
17
 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(b) (1964).
18 7 CCH 1971 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 11 6738, at 71,508 n.13, 71,510 [hereinafter
cited as CCH Fed. Tax Rep.].
10 Bulletin F was first updated in 1931 and again in 1942. In the late 1950's a Trea-
sury study was undertaken to again revise Bulletin F. This study concluded, however,
that the asset-by-asset approach of Bulletin F did not adequately reflect obsolescence and
that consequently it often projected longer useful lives than necessary. Id. at 71,508-09.
20 Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 418.
21
 6-4th Tax Management, Depredation—Guideline Lives and Reserve Ratio, A-3
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Tax Management].
22 Id.
23
 Romak, Depreciation Reform: Using the New Guideline Lives, N.Y.U. 22nd Inst.
on Fed. Tax 465 (1964).
24 Tax Management, supra note 21, at A-5.
25
 CCH Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 18, at 71,511.
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for the Treasury, it was much easier to determine an average useful
life for a guideline class than for each asset within that guideline class."
A novel feature of the 1962 Guidelines, "the reserve ratio test,"
served as a control on the determination of guideline lives. Through this
test it could be determined' whether a taxpayer's actual retirement and
replacement practices justified his continued use of the guideline
lives; 27
 depending on the results, the lives could be lengthened or short-
ened, thereby decreasing or increasing the acceptable depreciation
deduction. The reserve ratio was expressed as the ratio of the total of
the depreciation reserves for those assets in a guideline class to the
original total cost of those assets. The ideal reserve ratio was based on
a stable account, that is, one in which new assets were added only when
necessary to replace retired assets. After a sufficient number of years,
the dollar value of assets annually retired and replaced would be fairly
constant. Under the straight line method of depreciation, the account
as a whole would.always be one-half depreciated, thereby providing a
reserve ratio of fifty percent." Realizing, however, that a perfectly
stable account was impossible because of variations in businesses and
in the expansion and contraction of business growth, the Treasury de-
veloped tables which gave the ideal reserve ratio for each guideline
class, and also provided a range above and below the ideal." If a tax-
payer failed the reserve ratio test, he was nonetheless entitled to his
depreciation deduction if he could show that circumstances justified the
tax lives he had claimed."
The Treasury provided transitional rules designed to enable tax-
payers to make a gradual adjustment to the full force of the reserve
ratio test.' Originally a transition period of three years was indicated,
during which the guideline lives were permitted to be used as a matter
of right, without regard to the reserve ratio test." As this three-year
period ended in 1965, however, business taxpayers contended that more
time was required in order to adjust their retirement and replacement
28 Tax Management, supra note 21, at A-7.
27 CCI-I Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 18, at 71,.512.
28
 Romak, supra note 23, at 469. For example, if the original cost of assets in a
guideline class were $250,000 and straight line depreciation were used, then, assuming the
group of assets was used by the taxpayer for a sufficient number of years so that retire-
ments and replacements had occurred, the total of the depreciation reserve would be
$125,000 and, consequently, the reserve ratio would be 50% ($125,000 $250,000).
29 Such ranges were given in tables established for various lives and types of de-
predation methods. There were two variations of the reserve ratio test. One was called
the tabular method form, Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 439; the other, adopted
in 1965, was called the guideline form. Rev. Proc. 65-13, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 760. Gen-
erally, the latter method provided for more liberalized transition rules which the taxpayer
could employ in applying the reserve ratio test. S. Surrey, W. Warren, P. McDaniel &
H. Ault, Federal Income Taxation at p. 3-138 (unpublished text available from Profs. Mc-
Daniel and Ault, at the Boston College Law School).
80 Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 429-34.
31 Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 4.36.
32 Johnson, Selected Provisions of the Revenue Bill of 1962, 1963 U. So. Cal. Tax
Inst. 77, 106.
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policies to conform with guideline lives." Only about thirty-five percent
of the taxpayers utilizing the 1962 Guidelines would have met the re-
serve ratio test. The other sixty-five percent therefore would have had
asset depreciable lives increased, thereby reducing deductions for de-
preciation and increasing tax liability." Responding to this situation,
the Treasury issued Revenue Procedure 65-13. This Procedure supplied
additional transitional rules which extended the three-year moratorium
by raising the upper limit of the standard reserve ratio by a certain
number of percentage points." These rules were to be phased out over
the guideline life periods. The result was that a full implementation of
the reserve ratio test as originally conceived never occurred. In fact,
because of the phase out period of the transitional rules, the reserve
ratio test would not have begun to exert a real effect until 1971.3°
Opponents of the reserve ratio test, arguing that its approach was
too complex, urged the finding of a simpler method to compute deprecia-
tion for tax purposes." However, the Treasury and those favoring the
reserve ratio test reasoned that it was "easier to go through the detailed
computations surrounding the reserve ratio test beforehand, to deter-
mine the depreciation deduction, than to end up ultimately in time-
consuming, costly controversies with revenue agents as to what the
depreciable life should be."" In addition, the proponents argued that
this approach was a good basis for determining the useful Iife of each
class of assets." However, the Treasury Department began to believe
that the reserve ratio test was an ineffective control on the guideline
system." The Treasury based its conclusion on the fact that the test
only measured the past practices of taxpayers. 4 ' Further, the Treasury
pointed out that " [s] eventy-five percent of the IRS conferees who
[handled] disputed or unagreed depreciation issues beyond the revenue
agent level . . ." believed that the reserve ratio test was too complicated
and not helpful in solving controversies over useful lives."
On June 23, 1971, the Treasury again substantially altered the con-
cept of "useful life" by issuing the ADR Regulations. The new rules
permitted a taxpayer to vary the depreciation period of an asset by up
to twenty percent from the 1962 Guideline lives; they also eliminated
the reserve ratio test." The promulgation of these regulations prompted
23
 Patton, New Problems in the Interpretation and Application of the Depredation
Guidelines: Departure From Guidelines Under Appropriate "Facts and Circumstances,"
N.Y.U. 24th Inst. on Fed. Tax. 1609, 1615 (1966).
34 Id. at 1616.
85 Rev. Proc. 65-13, 1965-1 Cum. Bull. 767.
35
 CCH Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 18, at 71,515.
17 Patton, supra note 33, at 1625.
88 Id.
39 Id. at 1626.
4° CCII Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 18, at 71,516.
41 Id. at 71,515.
42 Id. at 71,516.
43
 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b) (4)(i) (1971).
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immediate controversy." Opponents of the new system, those who had
supported use of the reserve ratio test, contended that the Treasury
Department's substantial alteration of the useful life concept without
some recognition of actual individual experience (supplied by the re-
serve ratio) was an unauthorized act under the Internal Revenue
Code." The Treasury Department based its legal authority to issue the
ADR Regulations on Sections 167 and 7805 of the Code. Section 7805
(a) gives the Treasury power to "prescribe all needful rules and regula-
tions for enforcement of [the Code]," 45 while Section 167(b) allows
the Secretary to issue regulations determining the manner of computing
a "reasonable allowance" for depreciation. 47 Since the term "useful
life" is not defined by the Code, the Treasury felt justified in determin-
ing this factor under its Code authority." In addition, the Treasury
argued that, because it had previously defined useful life in Bulletin F
and Revenue Procedure 62-21, it consequently had discretion to vary
the concept through the ADR System.4°
The counterargument raised by opponents of the ADR Regulation
was that Section 7805 (a) calls only for a clarifying regulation, or one
indicating the method of the Section's application, and that it does not
provide the power to amend the Code by regulation 5 0 Opponents con-
ceded that there is nothing illegal about a regulation such as ADR,
which is intended to stimulate economic growth, so long as it is within
the scope of authority granted the Treasury under the Code." However,
" See Wall Street Journal, June 23, 1971, at 4, col. 3; July 7, 1971, at 1, col. 5;
July 8, 1971, at 6, col. 3.
45 Id.
48
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7805(a). Courts have often used this section to uphold
the validity of regulations. The Supreme Court has stated that "Treasury regulations
must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes.
." Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); accord, Mor-
rison v. United States, 355 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 986 (1966).
Furthermore, the courts have declared § 7805 regulations invalid "only where there is an
attempt to amend by regulation a clear, specific and unambiguous statute." 117 Cong.
Rec. 113180 (daily ed. April 28, 1971) (statement by Joel Barlow, John Ellicott and
Jeffrey Howard, before the Department of the Treasury on April 12, 1971, placed into
the Record by Congressman Anderson).
47 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 167(b).
48
 117 Cong. Rec. H3182 (daily ed. April 28, 1971).
49 Id. at 113181.
80 Id. at H3180. This viewpoint is supported by Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441
(1936). In this case the Supreme Court, in determining the validity of a regulation, held
that:
Where the [revenue] act uses ambiguous terms, or is of doubtful construction,
a clarifying regulation or one indicating the method of its application to specific
cases not only is permissible but is to be given great weight by the courts. And
the same principle governs where the statute merely expresses a general rule and
invests the Secretary of the Treasury with authority to promulgate regulations
appropriate to its enforcement. But where ... the provisions of the act are am-
biguous, and its directions specific, there is no power to amend it by regulation.
Id. at 446-47.
Isl Bittker, Treasury Authority To Issue the Proposed "Asset Depreciation Range
System" Regulation, 49 Taxes 265, 268 (1971).
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ADR, it was argued, by arbitrarily altering the useful life periods, ex-
ceeded the "reasonable allowance" authority granted to the Secretary
by the Code."
Opponents also criticized the Treasury's contention that the term
"useful life" had not been defined by the Code. They noted that the
congressional intent, as expressed in the legislative history of section
167, was to allow annual depreciation deductions only if the computa-
tion took into account the actual useful life of the asset." The Supreme
Court, in interpreting section 167, held that depreciation is to be cal-
culated over an asset's estimated useful life while the asset is actually
employed by the taxpayer, and that "[t]his requires that the useful
life of the asset be related to the period for which it may reasonably be
expected to be employed in the taxpayer's business." 54
 Critics noted
that whenever Congress has seen a need for an artificial depreciation
period unrelated to an asset's actual life, such as in areas of low-income
housing or pollution control equipment, Congress has enacted exceptions
to the general rule, rather than leaving such responsibility to the Trea-
sury." In addition, it was argued that the result sought to be achieved
by the ADR Regulation, that is, the stimulation of investment, was the
same as that intended through the use of the investment tax credit. 5°
52
 Id. at 272.
55
 117 Cong. Rec. E4560, E4565 (daily ed. May 18, 1971) (letter submitted by Paul
R. McDaniel, Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School, dated May 5, 1971,
placed into the Record by Congressman Vanik). It was noted that when § 167, dealing
with depreciation, was adopted by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the House Ways
and Means Committee had expressly stated that depreciation is "the method by which the
capital invested in an asset is recovered tax-free over the years it is used in a business.
The annual deduction is computed by spreading the cost of the property over its estimated
useful life." H.R. Rep. No. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 404-6-47 (1954) (emphasis added).
54
 Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 107 (1960). Taxpayers in this
case were in the business of leasing new cars. Approximately a year and one-half after
acquisition, the cars were sold and new ones purchased. The court determined that the
proper depredation period for the cars was not their intrinsic economic life but the period
during which they were actually used by the taxpayer; accord, Hertz Corp. v. United
States, 364 U.S. 122 (1960).
As previously noted in the discussion of the 1962 Guidelines, the reserve ratio test
was adopted in order to tie group life to the taxpayer's own replacement and retirement
experiences. In fact, "leading experts [had] said that dropping the reserve ratio test with-
out substituting any other procedures to police a close relationship between tax lives and
actual lives would require an act of Congress." 117 Cong. Rec. H3396 (daily ed. May 3,
1971) (Richard Pollock, in his Treasury Research Study No. 2. for the Dep't of the
Treasury, entitled "Tax Depreciation and the Need for the Reserve Ratio Test," pub-
lished August 1, 1968, placed into the Record by Congressman Vanik).
55
 Bittker, supra note 51, at 270. Congress has enacted depreciation and amortization
provisions covering expenditures for rehabilitating low-income housing (I 167(k)), pol-
lution control facilities (§ 169), research ({ 174), soil and water conservation (§ 175),
trademark and trade names (§ 177), additional first-year depreciation (I 179), and rail-
road and rolling stock (§§ 184 and 185).
55 In the Revenue Act of 1962, Congress, through § 38, provided an incentive to
investment by enacting the investment credit. This device was designed to stimulate the
economy by allowing a tax credit for new investment. The investment credit was sus-
pended in 1966 by § 48(h) because it had worked too well, causing too heavy a demand
877
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When the investment tax credit was repealed by the Tax Reform Act
of 1969, the Senate Finance Committee recommended that if "the need
should ... arise for a ... stimulant to investment, the Congress will .. .
be free to consider various alternative types of treatment. 751 This posi-
tion has been interpreted to mean that, in repealing the investment
credit, Congress implied that if it decided that a stimulus was needed,
Congress would reenact legislation, and not leave the responsibility to
an administrative agency. 58 Congress apparently has conceded that
doubt existed as to the Treasury Department's power to promulgate
the ADR Regulations, since included in the recently enacted Revenue
Act of 1971 is a provision which specifically allows a twenty percent
reduction in useful lives from the present guideline system."
II. THE ADR SYSTEM
Whereas the 1962 Guideline system attempted to administer its de-
preciation provisions on an individual basis through use of the reserve
ratio test, under the ADR System a reasonable allowance for deprecia-
tion may be based on industry-wide, rather than individual taxpayer
experience regarding the useful lives of assets." The system is optional.
If the taxpayer chooses ADR, his election must be made in the income
tax return for the taxable year in which he places the eligible property
into service." Those assets placed in service after December 31, 1970,
are eligible for ADR treatment. 82 Such assets include tangible personal
property used in manufacturing, production or extraction, that used in
a trade or business, and also public utility property." These assets are
specifically described and classified by guideline lives in Revenue Pro-
cedure 71-25, which accompanied the initial ADR Regulation." This
on credit, which in turn created inflationary pressures. The credit was reactivated in
1967 by § 48(j), when the credit demand had subsided, but repealed in 1969, under § 49,
because of increased inflation. 117 Cong. Rec. 55569 (daily ed. April 26, 1971) (statement
of Senator Tower). However, the credit has again been reactivated by the Revenue Act
of 1971. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 50.
The investment credit allows most taxpayers a 7% investment tax credit which is
applied directly against the amount of income tax liability. Depredation is instead de-
ducted from income in order to arrive at the taxable income figure upon which income
tax liability is computed. The advantage of an investment credit is that it more directly
reduces the cost of property, while faster depreciation tends to distort income accounting
because it is a function of the taxpayer's marginal rate. Torrey, supra note 16, at 569.
57 S. Rep. No. 522, 91st Cong., 1st Seas. 226 (1969).
58 Bittker, supra note 51, at 269.
58 Section 167(m)(1) of the 1971 Act states that the reasonable allowance for de-
predation is "only an allowance based on the class life prescribed by the Secretary or his
delegate which reasonably reflects the anticipated useful life of that class of property to
the industry or other group. The 'allowance may . . . permit a variance from any class
life by not more than 20 percent . . ."
60 CCH Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 18, at 71,518.
el Treas. Reg. { 1.167(a)-11(f)(2)(0 (1971).
62 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(2)(i11) (1971).
65 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(2)(ii) (1971).
64 Rev. Proc. 71-25, 1971 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 28.
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Procedure does not provide guideline periods for buildings and realty
improvements. However, these assets were subsequently included in
the ADR System by the Revenue Act of 1971. The Act provides transi-
tional rules for these assets which allow the taxpayer either to use guide-
line lives prescribed in Revenue Procedure 62-21, or, until the Treasury
revises class lives for such assets, to use other, shorter lives if justified
under the 1962 Guidelines."
If the taxpayer elects ADR, the election generally must apply to
all his eligible property." The taxpayer may exclude all his used prop-
erty from this election if the total used property placed in service ex-
ceeds ten percent of the basis of all eligible property placed in service
during the taxable year.wr Presumably, this limitation is intended to
encourage the purchase of new rather than used machinery and equip-
ment; and also to make ADR correspond to section 167(c) (2), which
limits accelerated depreciation to new property acquired by the tax-
payer." Property depreciated according to any method other than
straight-line, declining balance and sum of the years-digits, is to be ex-
cluded from ADR treatment; and use of such methods will exclude all
other eligible property in the same asset guideline class." In addition,
property acquired merely through a change in the form of conducting
a trade or business is ineligible for the ADR System of depreciation."
This section is designed to prevent taxpayers from manipulating their
businesses so as to achieve inclusion of property placed in service before
January, 1971.
Once the taxpayer elects ADR, all eligible property is grouped into
"vintage accounts."" These accounts reflect the taxable year in which
the taxpayer first placed eligible assets in service. Each account consists
of assets belonging to a single guideline class. Assets in the same asset
guideline class may be divided among any number of vintage accounts"
because the permissible range of useful lives for each guideline class
allows a variance of up to twenty percent above or below the designated
guideline life. For example, a taxpayer acquiring four assets eligible
115
 Pub. L. No. 92-178, 1 109(e) (Dec. 10, 1971).
116
 Treas. Reg. I 1.167(a)-11(b)(5)(ii) (1971).
67
 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(5)(iii) (1971). For example, assume that the unad-
justed basis of all eligible property placed in service during a taxable year is $150,000.
If the unadjusted basis of all the used property placed in service during that taxable
year is over $15,000, the taxpayer may determine the lives of both new and used property
under ADR or, alternatively, he may determine the useful lives of the used property by
non-ADR methods.
08
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, I 167(c)(2).
al)
 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(5)(v)(a) (1971). Section 167(b)(4) of the Code
allows the taxpayer to use methods other than straight line, declining balance and sum
of the years-digits so long as they are used consistently. Methods which have been com-
monly used are the unit-production, retirement and machine hour methods. ADR, how-
ever, specifically excludes these and all other methods except straight line, declining balance
and sum of the years-digits. Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-11(b)(5)(v) (a) (1971).
70 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(7)(i) (1971).
71 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b) (3)(i) (1971).
72
 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(3)(i) (1971).
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for a given guideline class might choose to split them into two vintage
accounts, one of which might use the designated useful life and the
other employing a twenty percent shorter life.
A. Permissible Range of Useful Life Periods
As previously noted, the most significant change from any prior
depreciation method is in the range of useful lives permitted under
ADR: the Revenue Act of 1971 provides that the reasonable allowance
for depredation may vary "from any class life by not more than 20
percent . . . of such life."" The Treasury has determined the guideline
periods, that is, the useful lives of the asset guideline classes, and these
are set out in detail in Revenue Procedure 71-25. Under Revenue Pro-
cedure 62-21, taxpayer use of the guideline lives was not a matter of
right; rather, the taxpayer had to justify his assets' useful lives by
means of the reserve ratio test, or alternatively; through an explanation
supported by facts and circumstances." The ADR System, however,
in eliminating the reserve ratio as well as alternative tests, requires no
justification of past retirement or replacement experience."
Proponents of the ADR System believe that this change will greatly
simplify the administration of the depreciation provisions." However,
in removing the burden of proof from the taxpayer, a premium is placed
on the accuracy of the guideline lives. If any Treasury guideline life is
erroneous, the taxpayer has no recourse. Although taxpayers may vary
asset lives by twenty percent in either direction," it is expected that
most taxpayers will select a useful life at the lower end of the asset de-
preciation range, thereby effecting a twenty percent shortening of useful
lives." In order to insure the accuracy of the guideline periods, the
ADR System also provides for periodic revision and supplementation
of the guidelines, which will reflect current industry-wide experience
with such assets."
B. Salvage Value
Another difference between the prior regulations and ADR lies in
the treatment of "salvage value." Salvage value is the estimated value
which the taxpayer will realize when he sells or otherwise disposes of the
property at the end of its useful life." This value has been treated in dif-
78 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 167(m)(1). For example, under Revenue Proc. 71-25
office furniture and fixtures such as desks and files have a guideline life of 10 years. The
useful life range would thus be between 8 (80% of 10) and 12 years (120% of 10).
79 7 CCH 1971 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. if 6738, at 71,530 [hereinafter cited as CCH
Fed. Tax Rep.].
Sunley, The 1971 Depreciation Revision: Measures of Effectiveness, 24 Nat. Tax
J. 19, 21 (1971).
76 CCH Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 74, 1f 6738, at 71,503.
77 Treas. Reg. 1 1.167(a)-11(b)(4)(i) (1971).
78 Sunley, supra note 75, at 21.
79 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(b)(4)(ii) (1971).
80 Treas. Reg.	 1.167(a)-11(d)(1)(i) (1971).
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ferent ways in various methods of computing depreciation. One ap-
proach has been to reduce the unadjusted basis of the asset by its salvage
value and to use the resulting figure as a basis for depreciation." An-
other approach has been to use a rate of depreciation that takes into ac-
count the salvage value by depreciating the asset only until salvage value
is reached.' To simplify and make "uniform the treatment of estimated
salvage value for depreciation purposes . . .”" the ADR System dis-
regards salvage value in the determination of the annual depreciation
deduction. However, no vintage account may be depreciated below its
salvage value." Therefore, the depreciation deduction for a taxable
year may not exceed the excess between the unadjusted basis of the
vintage account and the total amount of the depreciation reserve plus
its estimated salvage value." Thus the salvage value reduces the annual
depreciation only in the last year of the asset's life instead of being
spread over the entire period. The result is yet another form of acceler-
ated depreciation for the taxpayer since, by not reducing the basis for
depreciation by the salvage value, be uses a larger basis from which to
compute the annual depreciation deduction.
The question arises, however, as to which asset life the taxpayer
should use in estimating the asset's salvage value upon his election of an
ADR asset depreciation period which differs from the asset's actual
period of use. The ADR System does not indicate which of several
possibilities should be used for the determination, The problem lies in
the fact that, the smaller the estimated salvage value used, the larger
will be the total amount of the depreciation deduction. This problem is
illustrated by the following example. Assume the taxpayer has an asset
having an actual useful life of fourteen years but an assigned asset
guideline period of ten years. The asset therefore falls within a deprecia-
tion range of eight to twelve years. If the salvage value were based on
the actual (fourteen year) life, it would be much less than the salvage
value based on useful life within the guideline range. By reducing sal-
vage value, the taxpayer would increase his basis for the depreciation
deduction, thus further accelerating the deduction. This result would be
in accord with the ADR's economic goals. However, selection of the
81 This procedure is followed in the straight line and sum of the years-digits methods
of depreciation. Treas. Reg. §11 1.167(b)-1(a), 1.167(b)-3(a) (1956).
82 This is the procedure followed in the declining balance method of depreciation.
Treas. Reg.	 1.167(b)-2(a) (1964).
83 CCII Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 74, 4 6500A, at 71,279.
84 Trees. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(1)(iv) (1971).
85 For example, assume a vintage account has an unadjusted basis of $ioepoo with
a guideline life of 10 years and an estimated salvage value of $lope°. Prior to ADR,
the basis of the property, for depreciation purposes, was reduced by the salvage value
so that for the 10 year period the annual deduction was $9,000 ($100,000 — $10,000
X 10%). At the end of the guideline period the depreciation reserve totalled $90,000.
Under ADR, the annual depreciation deduction would be $10,000 ($100,000 x 10%).
Because there can be no depreciation below the vintage account's salvage value, this
annual deduction could be taken for only 9 years, rather than 10; after 9 years at an
annual deduction of $10,000, the depreciation reserve would total $90,000.
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actual life would seriously conflict with the objective of administrative
simplification sought under the ADR System. An asset's actual life will
differ from taxpayer to taxpayer, depending upon individual use. To
allow the taxpayer to justify use of a salvage value based upon the sub-
jective determination of the asset's actual life would lead to the type of
administrative/judicial controversy which was meant to be avoided
through the elimination of the reserve ratio.
If the salvage value is determined by using the taxpayer's "elected
life and he selects the lower limit of the guideline range (an eight-year
life), the estimated salvage value would be much higher than the sal-
vage value resulting from use of the actual (fourteen year) useful life.
This method would provide the taxpayer with a lower basis from
which to compute his total depreciation deductions. Although the selec-
tion of this shorter period would decrease the taxpayer's total deduction,
and would not conform to the ADR goal of increased acceleration, it
would eliminate the IRS-taxpayer controversies which would occur if
actual useful life were used to determine salvage value.
Under ADR salvage value must be estimated at the time of filing
the tax return for the year the asset is placed in service." The estimate
is no longer subject to redetermination by the IRS, provided that the
facts and circumstances known at the time of estimation sufficiently
supported the estimation and the estimate does not need an adjustment
of more than ten percent of the cost of the asset." This ten percent mar-
gin of error in the estimation of salvage value is in addition to that
provided by Section 167(f) (1) of the Code, which already permits the
taxpayer to reduce estimated salvage value by ten percent of the asset's
cost."
Another new ADR provision deals with the taxpayer's desire to
change his method of depredation. Prior to ADR, a change in deprecia-
tion methods was allowed only with the permission of the Treasury."
The Regulations state, however, that this procedure does not apply to
a taxpayer who selects ADR." The taxpayer need only indicate the
Be Treas. Reg, § 1.167(a)-11(d)(1)(iii) (1971).
87 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-II(d) (I) (v) (1971).
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(1)(ii) (1971). For illustration, assume a taxpayer
in 1971 places in service assets which have an unadjusted basis of $120,000 and an esti-
mated gross salvage value of $30,000. The taxpayer may reduce the amount of salvage
value to be taken into account by $12,000 (10% of $120,000) as permitted by § 167(f).
The result is a salvage value of $18,000. Because of the added margin of error now
allowed under ADR the salvage value figure will not be redetermined unless the Internal
Revenue Service can show that there is a sufficient basis for determining a different sal-
vage value for the vintage account. In our example the taxpayer could claim $6,000
salvage value ($30,000 salvage value minus $12,000 allowed by 167(f), minus an additional
$12,000 reduction allowed under ADR) before being subject to redetermination. Therefore,
whereas that basis absent the Code sections would have been $90,000 ($120,000 — $30,000),
it can be enlarged to $114,000 ($120,000 — $16,000), thereby increasing the depreciation
deduction for most of the asset's useful life. •
89 Treas. Reg. { 1.167(e)-1(a),(1965).
00 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(c) (1)(iii) (1971).
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change and the vintage account for which he is making the change on
the income tax return of the year he makes the change. However, any
change must apply to all property in the taxpayer's vintage account.
The overall effect of these changes reflects the liberalized deprecia-
tion allowances afforded by ADR. The burden is no longer on the tax-
payer to justify his estimation of salvage value or his change in methods
of depreciation; rather, the burden is now on the Treasury. This pre-
sumption of correctness will simplify the administrative tasks of both
the taxpayer and Treasury. However, these changes will also have the
effect of further reducing taxable revenue."
C. Repair Allowance
Section 162(a) of the Code states that " [t] here shall be allowed
as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on a trade or business . . . ."" Al-
though a business expenditure may be ordinary and necessary, it is not
deductible, however, if capital in nature. A repair to depreciable prop-
erty is a deductible ordinary and necessary expense; but the amount
spent to restore or improve depreciable property is considered a non-
deductible capital expenditure. The determinative question is whether
the expenditure has appreciably prolonged the life of the property.
Regulation 1.162-4 summarizes this test as follows:
The cost of incidental repairs which neither materially add
to the value of the property nor appreciably prolong its life,
but keep it in ordinarily efficient operating condition, may be
deducted as an expense. . . . Repairs in the nature of replace-
ments, to the extent that they arrest deterioration and appreci-
ably prolong the life of the property, shall either be capitalized
and depreciated in accordance with section 167 or charged
against the depreciation reserve if such account is kept."
Whether an expenditure "appreciably prolongs an asset's life," how-
ever, is to some extent a matter of judgment which must be determined
by regulatory interpretation or through a case-by-case judicial ap-
proach.
The ADR System, on the other hand, provides an optional mechan-
ical test for determining whether certain ambiguous expenditures are
deductible or capital in nature. ADR Revenue Procedure 71-25 provides
an asset guideline repair allowance percentage for each guideline class."
These percentages are based on the "Treasury's evaluation of statisti-
cal and other data reflecting industry experience with respect to such
expenditures for asset guideline classes."" The repair allowance deduc-
81 See 117 Cong. Rec. E4563 (daily ed. May 18, 1971).
02 ht. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a).
99 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4 (1958).
94 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(2) (ill) (1971).
95 CCH Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 74, 11 6738, at 71,506. Taxpayers who elect ADR
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tion for a taxable year is computed for each vintage account by multiply-
ing the allowed percentage by the average balance of the unadjusted
basis of the vintage account." This amount represents the repair ex-
pense deductible in the current taxable year. Repair, maintenance,
rehabilitation and improvement expenditures which exceed such repair
deductions are treated as "property improvements,"" and are capital-
ized in "special basis vintage accounts." 9S These special accounts, in
turn, are depreciated over the same depreciation period as their related
vintage accounts.
The following example illustrates the effect of a taxpayer's election
to apply the asset guideline repair allowance percentage. Assume that,
for a particular taxable year, the taxpayer has an average unadjusted
basis of $100,000 in a certain vintage account and that its correspond-
ing asset guideline repair allowance percentage for that class is 5.5
percent. In addition, assume that the taxpayer incurs $9,000 worth of
expenditures for repair, maintenance, rehabilitation and improvement
of such property in that vintage account. The asset guideline repair
allowance is $5,500 ($100,000 X 5.5 percent) and, therefore, the tax-
payer can deduct that amount as a current expense. The taxpayer must
capitalize the remainder, or $3,500, in a special vintage account and
depreciate that amount over the same guideline life selected for the
capitalized asset's vintage account.
As noted, the repair allowance election covers only an expenditure
ambiguous as to whether it is deductible as a repair expense or non-
deductible as a capital outlay. 99 However, the problem of who deter-
mines what constitutes an ambiguous expenditure is left unanswered
by ADR. It remains to be seen whether the decision will be left to tax-
payer discretion or to administrative/judicial determination. Expendi-
tures which are clearly to be capitalized are "excluded additions" and
as such are excluded in the computation of the repair deduction.'"
These exclusions are expenditures which amount to an additional identi-
fiable unit of property; or which substantially increase the productivity
or capacity of an identifiable unit of property; or which represent a
modification of an existing unit of property for a substantially different
use.'" Each excluded addition is capitalized in a vintage account and
treated accordingly. 102
The purpose of the ADR's procedure for determining repair ex-
penses is to simplify the problem of distinguishing a deductible repair
are required to provide the Treasury with information as to such expenditures in order
that repair allowance percentages may be revised. Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(f)(4)(ii)(e)
(1971).
00 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(2)(iii) (1971).
97 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(2)(iv)(a) (1971).
98 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1I(d)(3)(vi) (1971).
09 CCH Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 74, 11 6738, at 71,506.
lo0 Trees. Reg. § 1.167 (a)-11(d) (2) (iv) (1971).
101 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(2)(vi) (1971).
102 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(2)(viii)(e) (1971).
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expense from a capital expenditure. However, as with all mechanical
tests, it fails to account for the actual experience of the individual tax-
payer. In the example above, if the total $9,000 were actually all de-
ductible repair expenses, then, by deducting only $5,500 currently,
the taxpayer overstates his taxable income by $3,500. Conversely, if
the entire amount should have been capitalized, then the taxpayer un-
derstates his taxable income by $5,500. ADR does, however, provide
some subjectivity by making the percentage formula optional. If the
taxpayer does not elect to follow the repair allowance percentage
method, he must continue to use the usual Code tests previously de-
scribed.' In this situation, his capitalized expenditures are included
in the special vintage accounts and depreciated in the same manner as
property improvements.'"
D. Retirement of Assets
Under Treasury Regulation 1.167(a)-8, the retirement of an asset
means "the permanent withdrawal of depreciable property from use in
the trade or business or in the production of income."' An asset can
be retired as a result of a sale, an exchange, a transfer of the property
to a supplies or scrap account, an abandonment, or any other permanent
disposition of the property. Although this same definition is used in
the ADR System, the specific rules of Treasury Regulation 1.167(a)-8
do not apply to the retirement of property from vintage accounts,"°°
For purposes of ADR, retirements are classified as "ordinary" or
44extraordinary.7147
 An extraordinary retirement is (a) one that renders
the property economically useless to the taxpayer as the result of a
casualty such as a fire, storm or shipwreck; or (b) one in which the
property is retired as a direct result of the taxpayer terminating, curtail-
ing or disposing of his trade or business, and in which the retired prop-
erty exceeds twenty percent of the unadjusted basis of the entire vintage
account prior to the event." Upon retirement, the unadjusted basis
of the retirement asset and its estimated salvage value are removed
from the vintage account, and the depreciation reserve (amount of de-
preciation deductions already allowed) is reduced by the applicable
amount of depreciation allowed for the retired property in prior years.'"
103 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 162, 263. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
104 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(2)(iv)(b) (1971).
106 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-8(a) (1956).
106 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(3)(i) (1971).
10T Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(3)(ii) (1971).
108 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(3)(ii) (1971). Under Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-8(b)
(1956) retirements are classified as "normal" and "abnormal." The abnormal retirement
is similar to ADR's extraordinary retirement in that it includes situations where the asset
was made economically useless by a casualty. It differs from the ADR categorization by
including a retirement due to extraordinary obsolescence which was not foreseen by the
taxpayer at the time he placed the asset in service.
1°0 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(3)(iv) (1971).
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It is at this time that the taxpayer will recognize any gain or loss due to
the extraordinary retirement. 11°
All other ADR retirements are considered ordinary; in this cate-
gory there is no recognition of loss and only limited recognition of
gain."' All proceeds received by the taxpayer in an ordinary retirement
are added to the depreciation reserve of that asset's vintage account,
and the retired asset's unadjusted basis and applicable depreciation
reserve allowance are not removed from the vintage account. The un-
derlying purpose of this procedure is that the unrecovered basis of the
retired asset is to be recovered through the depreciation deductions,
rather than by an immediate recognition of loss. 112 The procedure is
intended to prevent taxpayer manipulation of losses. In an ordinary
retirement, when the addition of proceeds to a vintage account's de-
preciation reserve causes the vintage account's unadjusted basis to be
less than the depreciation reserve plus the salvage value, the total sal-
vage value must be reduced (even to zero) so that the unadjusted basis
is never exceeded by the reserve for depreciation plus salvage value.'"
At the end of the taxable year, if a vintage account's unadjusted basis is
still exceeded by the depreciation reserve (even though the vintage
account's salvage value has been reduced to zero), the entire amount
of excess is recognized as a gain for that taxable year.'" The deprecia-
tion reserve is reduced by the amount of gain recognized so that the
total unadjusted basis of the vintage account will equal the depreciation
reserve; consequently, no further depreciation deductions would be
allowed for this account.'" When the last asset in a vintage account is
retired and the account's unadjusted basis exceeds the depreciation
reserve, then such excess is recognized as a loss and the vintage account
is terminated.l 1° Costs of dismantling, demolishing or removing the
retired assets are treated as an expense deductible in the taxable year
incurred.'- 7
The operation of the ADR retirement provisions is illustrated
in the following example. Assume that a taxpayer has selected a ten
year useful life for a vintage account having an unadjusted basis of
$10,000; the account has a salvage value of $1,000 and has been de-
preciated by the straight-line method for six years. The depreciation
reserve would, therefore, total $6,000 (6 X $1,000). In the seventh
year the taxpayer sells an asset for $1,000 in an ordinary retirement.
110
 Treas. Reg. $ 1.167(a)-11(d)(3)(iv) (1971). All gains and losses are specifically
subjected to Code provisions § 165 (losses), § 1231 (involuntary conversions) and § 1245
(recapture). In addition, "all other applicable provisions of law" apply to ADR retire-
ments. Id.
111 Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-11(d)(3)(iii)	 (1971).
112 Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-11(d)(3)(iii) (a)
	 (1971).
113 Treas. Reg. 1.167(a) -11 (d) (3) (iii) (a)	 (1971).
114 Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-11(d)(3)(ix)(a)
	 (1971).
115 Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-11(d)(3) (ix) (a) 	 (1971).
116 Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-11(d) (3) (ix) (b)
	 (1971).
117
 Treas. Reg. 1.167(a)-11(d)(3)(x)	 (1971).
886
THE ASSET DEPRECIATION RANGE (ADR) SYSTEM
He would recognize no gain or loss on this transaction, only an increase
in the depreciation reserve by the amount of the proceeds, bringing
its total to $7,000. At the end of the seventh year, again based on the
straight-line method, the taxpayer would be allowed a $1,000 deduc-
tion, thereby increasing the reserve to $8,000. If, in the eighth year,
there occurred an extraordinary retirement which completely destroyed
an asset having an unadjusted basis of $1,000 and prior allowable de-
preciation of $700, the unadjusted basis of the vintage account would
be reduced to $9,000 ($10,000 minus $1,000) and the reserve would
decrease to $7,300 ($8,000 minus $700). In addition, at this time, the
taxpayer would recognize a $300 loss. If, in that same year, there oc-
curred an ordinary retirement yielding proceeds of $1,800, then the
reserve ($7,300) plus the salvage value ($1,000) when added to the
proceeds ($1,800) would exceed the unadjusted basis of the account
by $1,100 ($11,100 minus $9,000). The effect of this transaction would
be a reduction of the salvage value to zero and a recognition of the ex-
cess $100 as gain. The recognition of this gain would in turn reduce
the depreciation reserve to $9,000. Since this amount would equal the
unadjusted basis of the vintage account, no further depreciation would
be allowed.
When a retired asset is not immediately sold upon an ordinary
retirement (such as withdrawal of the asset from productive use with-
out a disposition), the taxpayer may transfer the retired asset to a
supplies or scrap account.' This involves reducing the vintage ac-
count's salvage value by the amount of salvage value attributable to
the retired asset, thereby assigning the retired asset a basis of zero in
the supplies or scrap account.' Under an alternative method, the
taxpayer may reduce the vintage account's value by the retired asset's
salvage value, but then that amount would be added to the vintage ac-
count's depreciation reserve. This would make the retired asset's basis
in the supplies or scrap account the same as its salvage value. 120
 Because
the basis of the retired asset in the supplies or scrap account will nor-
mally enter into the computation of taxable income in the near future,
when the asset is disposed of, the alternative method can have the result
of accelerating a deduction.121
 Such acceleration is due to the probability
that the retired asset in the supplies or scrap account will soon be dis-
posed of at a loss. This loss represents a deduction in the year disposed.
If, instead of its transfer to a supplies or scrap account, the asset had
been immediately retired, there would have been an ordinary retire-
ment. The proceeds from this retirement would have increased the
depreciation reserve and the taxpayer would not recognize a loss until
termination of the vintage account.
118
 Treas. Reg.	 1.167(a)-11(d)(3)(ii) (1971).
118 Treas. Reg. 6 I.167(a)-11(d)(3)(vii)(c)(1) (1971).
120 Treas. Reg.	 1.167(a)-11(d) (3) (vii) (c) (2) (1971).
121
 Monyek, Asset Depreciation Range Regulation Adopted With No Major Changes,
35 J. Taxation 150, 151 (1971).
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III. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF ADR
Despite projections of a general increase in tax revenue attribut-
able to ADR's effect on the nation's economy, it is clear that the System
will generate a substantial revenue loss. It is estimated that the provi-
sion will create a $2.8 billion reduction in business tax revenue in 1971
and that this loss will increase annually, reaching a high of $4.7 billion
in fiscal 1976. 122 The Treasury Department, however, contends that
the savings to taxpayers will increase business activity, which in turn
will generate additional tax revenues to offset most of the revenue re-
duction. Treasury studies project that business will increase its pace
of investment by at least 2.5 percent above what would have been in-
vested in eligible property if ADR bad not been adopted.'" Further,
it is contended that increased investment in modern production ma-
chinery and equipment, stimulated by the new liberalized depreciation
System, will serve to increase the Gross National Product, decrease
unemployment, and slow down inflation. 124
In order to understand the scope of tax savings to a taxpayer
switching to ADR, the effect of the twenty percent reduction in guide-
line lives must be analyzed.' Table 1 shows the impact of ADR on a
taxpayer who has been using the straight line method for five assets,
each having an unadjusted basis of $40,000, a guideline useful life of
five years, and no salvage value. For purposes of Table 1 it is assumed
that the taxpayer has been in business for a sufficiently long period of
time so that his replacements are made fairly regularly, that he replaces
one fully depreciated asset at the beginning of each year, and that con-
sequently he always has five assets in use. In 1971, the taxpayer elects
ADR and takes advantage of the twenty percent reduction in the de-
preciation period, thereby decreasing the useful life of each asset to
122 Sunley, supra note 75, at 19. These figures were computed on the basis of a
modified half-year convention, a tax device included in the initial ADR provisions but
omitted by the Revenue Act of 1971. The resulting tax loss will not be as great as orig-
inally projected.
APR will also exert a significant influence on the economies of the individual states.
Since the computation of a state's tax revenue depends heavily on federal corporate tax
rules, any change in permissible depreciation causes similar changes for the state's revenues.
117 Cong. Rec. E9630 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1971) (letter from Vincent X. Yakowicz,
Deputy Secretary for Taxation for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, dated Aug. 26,
1971, placed into the Record by Congressman Green). For example, it has been estimated
that California will lose about $30 million in annual corporate tax revenues because of
the new APR System. Id. at E9631 (letter to the Nation's Governors, Mayors, and County
Executives, from Ralph Nader, placed into the Record by Congressman Green): "In 1969,
California derived $593 million from this source. Therefore, the loss represents 5% of
annual corporate tax revenues." Id. APR will also reduce local government's property tax
revenues, because local property assessors often depend on the Treasury's depreciation
rates for computing the tax base of property. Id. This decrease in the taxable property base
could be quite substantial. "Furthermore, the loss will not be spread evenly. Rather, it
will be concentrated in heavily industrialized areas such as Chicago, Gary, Cleveland, and
Newark," cities which cannot bear any more fiscal problems than they already face. Id.
128 CCH Fed. Tax Rep., supra note 74, 11 6738, at 71,528.
124 Id. at 71,530.
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$42,000 $ 960 $ 9601971 40,000 $2,000
1972 40,000 44,000 4,000 1,920 2,880
1973 40,000 46,000 6,000 2,880 5,760
1974 40,000 48,000 8,000 3,440 9,600
1975 40,000 40,000 -0- -0- 9,600
a Since each asset (having a five-year useful life) cost $40,000, the annual deprecia-
tion by the straight line method is $8,000. With five assets each depreciated at an annual
rate of $8,000, the total depreciation for all assets is $40,000.







Cost 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
1967 $40,000 $8,000
1968 40,000 8,000 $8,000
1969 40,000 8,000 8,000 $8,000
1970 40,000 8,000 8,000 8,000 $8,000
1971c 40,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 $-0.-
1972 40,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
1973 40,000 10,000 10,000 10,000
1974 40,000 10,000 10,000
1975 40,000 10,000
$42,000 $44,000 $46,000 $48,000 $40,000
e Under ADR, the average life of each asset is four years; each asset has an annual
depreciation of $10,000.
four years (5 X 80 percent). (Table 2 shows the computation of de-
preciation deductions from 1971 through 1975, the period during which
the taxpayer uses ADR). As Table 1 demonstrates, the taxpayer would
enjoy steadily increasing tax savings for the first four years and no tax
savings in year five and thereafter. However, the cumulative tax sav-
ings effect would be quite substantial, as the $9,600 figure indicates,
although theoretically this amount is only a deferral, to be repaid in
later years of the useful life of the assets when depreciation deductions
will be small.
Table 1 shows only the tax savings resulting from ADR's decrease
of the depreciation periods. The illustration does not take into account
additional tax savings resulting from increased business deductions
through the use of the new repair allowance percentage, the salvage
value methods, or the other changes in tax depreciation brought about
by the ADR System. Even more important, Table 1 assumes a
stable business, that is, one with no investment expansion. When these
factors are considered, it is clear that an even greater tax saving would
result.
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Table 1 shows that after the fifth year (1974) there is no further
annual tax saving. As noted, however, certain variables have been elim-
inated for purposes of illustration. For instance, expenditures for equip-
ment do not stay the same each year. According to current economic
trends, inflation alone will cause an increase in expenditures for re-
placement equipment.' In addition, in computing the actual tax saving,
one must consider additional investments. As the replacement cost and
additional equipment purchaSes increase, so too will the basis for com-
puting depreciation. This increase in basis will increase the taxpayer's
annual depreciation which, in turn, will permanently decrease the
amount of his tax liability. Therefore, considering the overall effect
of these variables, the taxpayer's annual tax saving under ADR will in
fact never be reduced to zero.
ADR's benefits to the taxpayer may also be measured in terms of
an "equivalent price reduction of assets," which measures the reduc-
tion in the actual cost of capital assets to the taxpayer; or in terms of
a reduction in the effective tax rate applied to income resulting from
the ownership of capital assets due to the higher depreciation deduc-
tions allowable.'" If a corporate taxpayer acquiring an asset with a
guideline life of twelve years takes advantage of the lower limit of the
useful life range (nine and one-half years), under the ADR System the
cost of this asset would be reduced by 3.78 percent,' and, assum-
ing a 48 percent corporate tax rate, the effective tax rate would be re-
duced to 44.3 percent."'
Still another means of demonstrating the economic effects of ADR
is to reflect the System's acceleration of depreciation in terms of an
investment tax credit equivalent. As noted previously,'" this tax device,
used to stimulate the national economy through increased investment,
applies a fixed percentage of the price of the newly purchased business
equipment or property directly against the amount of a taxpayer's tax
liability.'" The increased ADR deductions, if expressed in terms of a
direct credit against tax liability, would be equivalent to a 2.84 percent
investment tax credit for an asset having a twelve-year life, based on
a twelve percent after-tax rate of return on investments."' This com-
parison is significant because it measures the effects of ADR in terms of
125
 117 Cong. Rec. S5301, S5302 (daily ed. April 21, 1971) (Paper by Prof. Robert
Eisner, Dept. of Economics, Northwestern University, entitled The Asset Depreciation
Range System, placed into the Record by Senator Humphrey).
120 Sunley, The 1971 Depreciation Revision: Measures of Effectiveness, 24 Nat. Tax
J. 19, 21-30 (1971).
127 Id. at 24. It is interesting to note that the 7% investment tax credit reintroduced
in the Revenue Act of 1971 (§ 50) is worth an additional 9.29% decrease in the cost of the
asset. The investment tax credit and ADR together effect a price reduction of 13.07%.
Id.
128 Id. at 27. The new 7% investment tax credit alone reduces the 48% corporate
tax rate to 37.7%. Id.
129
 See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
180 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 46.
181 Sunley, supra note 126, at 29.
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the effects of an investment credit. Because an increase in the invest-
ment credit could achieve the same goals sought by ADR, it is necessary
to examine the tax policy considerations which underlie ADR.
IV. TAX POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Since the ADR System will reportedly decrease tax revenue by
over $35 billion over the next decade,'" and by almost $50 billion by
1990,iaa its putative merits should be closely examined. As previously
noted, the Treasury's rationale for supporting this reduction in business
tax liability is that ADR will encourage higher investment, which in
turn will produce the multiplier effect of spurring economic productivity
and growth by increasing wages, creating jobs and curbing inflation.'
The underlying assumption is that the additional purchasing power
effected by the tax reduction will be directed toward increasing business
production capacity. 1" However, this assumption may be fallacious.
Noted economists have pointed out that a "business produces for prof-
its," and that it will not usually increase production unless there exists
a commensurate consumer demand.'" Simply because it has more funds
available for equipment investment does not necessarily mean that a
business will invest.'" Conversely, even if it has no cash on hand, a
business might make the necessary expenditure for new equipment if
it speculates a higher rate of return than the cost of investment. In
this case, the business will borrow to meet the additional costs."'
Opponents of the ADR System have suggested that businesses will
not likely increase their productive capacity by investing in new equip-
ment when, under present economic conditions, manufacturing indus-
tries are operating at only seventy-five percent capacity. 1" In fact,
critics argue that the reason for such a low capacity rate is that the
economy was unable to sustain the capital investment growth between
1963 and 1969, a growth encouraged and stimulated by both the de-
creased depreciation lives of the 1962 Guidelines and the seven per-
cent investment tax credit.'" They contend that because of this subsidy,
182 Bittker, Treasury Authority To Issue the Proposed "Asset Depredation Range
System" Regulation, 49 Taxes 265, 267 (1971).
1311 117 Cong. Rec. 55302 (daily ed. April 21, 1971). Note, however, that this figure
was computed with the modified half-year convention, another accelerated depredation
device, now excluded by § 167(m) (2). Nonetheless, the resulting figure is not significantly
changed.
184 7 CCH 1971 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. 6738 at 71,530.
136 Id.
no P. Samuelson, Economics 384 (6th ed. 1964). See also 117 Cong. Rec. 55302
(daily ed. April 21, 1971).
137 117 Cong. Rae. 55302 (daily ed. April 21, 1971).
188 Id .
in 117 Cong. Rec. E4560, E4564 (daily ed. May 18, 1971) (article by Charles Daven-
port entitled Comment on Treasury's Proposed Substitution of Cost Recovery Allowances
for Depreciation, placed into the Record by Congressman Vanik).
140 117 Cong. Rec. E6725, E6727 (daily ed. June 29, 1971) (article by Nat Gold-
finger entitled The Fast Write-Off Tax Gimmick, published June, 1971, in the AFL-CIO
American Federationist, placed into the Record by Congressman Gibbons).
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investment in capital goods increased at a rate faster than that of the
Gross National Product. This situation, in turn, helped generate the
present inflationary trend since the tax incentives caused the economy's
productive capacity to increase at a rate artificially higher than that of
the economy's demand.' 41
As is generally true of most tax incentives, the ADR System dis-
criminates among types of taxpayers 1 42 Because its provisions are
restricted to business property, its benefits do not directly reach individ-
ual nonbusiness taxpayers. Furthermore, because the effect of ADR is
an increase in a deduction taken against gross income, its worth to a
given taxpayer becomes a function of his marginal rate. An individual
in the seventy percent bracket having noncorporate business income
will receive far greater benefits than one in the fourteen percent
bracket.' 48
 Corporations—those most significantly affected by the ADR
changes—while not taxed at the same graduated rates as individuals,
have a modified form of progressivity in their two-tier tax rate: those
with taxable income of $25,000 or less are taxed at a twenty-two per-
cent rate, while those earning more than $25,000 are taxed at twenty-
two percent on the initial $25,000 and forty-eight percent on the
remainder.'" Thus a corporation with low income receives less benefit
than a large one, and one with no income or losses receives no benefit
at all. This difference in benefits may be seen by comparing the effects
of ADR, in terms of the percentage reduction in the cost of capital
assets, upon twenty-two and forty-eight percent corporate taxpayers.
The price of an asset having a twelve-year guideline life (ADR reduc-
tion to nine and one-half years) is reduced by only 1.42 percent to the
twenty-two percent corporation, but by 3.78 percent to the forty-eight
percent corporation."' Therefore, the overall effect of ADR's accelera-
tion of depreciation is to shield income by higher depreciation deduc-
tions. This result favors large business taxpayers who would otherwise
be paying a high rate of tax on their income."' The preferential treat-
ment accorded to large businesses tends to prejudice the relative com-
petitiveness of small businesses.'
Even conceding that ADR will actually increase and stimulate
growth through the use of increased depreciation deductions, it is sug-
gested that there exists a more efficient means of attaining this goal.
141 Id.
142 Surrey, Tax Incentives As a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison With Direct Government Expenditures, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 705, 722 (1970);
117 Cong. Rec. E4563 (daily ed. May 18, 1971).
143 Surrey, supra note 142, at 731. For example, the taxpayer in the 70% income
tax bracket who increases his taxable income by the same figure—say $50,000—also re-
duces his tax liability by the same 70% rate, or $35,000. The same depreciation deduction
increase of $50,000 to a taxpayer in the 50% bracket results in only a $25,000 decrease of
his tax liability.
144 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 0 11.
145 Sunley, supra note 126, at 24.
146 117 Cong. Rec. E4563 (daily ed. May 18, 1971).
147 Sunley, supra note 126, at 25 n.16.
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The investment tax credit avoids the aforementioned discriminatory
effect as between large and small businesses. Since the credit is applied
against tax liability, it is of equal benefit to big and small businesses
which invest in eligible property. If the seven percent investment tax
credit provided by the Revenue Act of 1971 alone cannot produce
the desired results, then the credit should be increased accordingly.
There would then be no need for an ADR System which presently
appears to give rise to inefficiency, inequity and wasteful tax expendi-
tures.
Under the ADR System unequal tax treatment results even among
those taxpayers in the same income bracket. The new system only
confers benefits on those businesses which are capital intensive,'" that
is, those that require substantial capital assets for production. The
increase in depreciation deductions effected by ADR is of little value to
a business requiring few depreciable capital assets, no matter how great
its income. The ADR salvage value provisions also create different
treatment of similarly situated businesses. The rule under ADR is that
salvage value is ignored in computing depreciation—except that prop-
erty may not be depreciated below salvage value."° Previously, salvage
value was deducted from the cost of the property in order to determine
the basis on which depreciation was computed. ADR benefits the tax-
payer who replaces his asset at a time when it still has a salvage value;
but ADR provides no benefit to the taxpayer who uses his asset until
it has no salvage value or until the end of its actual useful life.'" The
combination of these discriminatory factors makes the new system
questionable on grounds of tax policy alone, even ignoring economic
policy. Instead of helping to achieve the goal of equally taxing similarly
situated persons, the ADR changes assure that similarly situated per-
sons will be taxed unequally.'"
As noted previously, the ADR changes will result in a $3 billion
annual subsidy to the business community over the next decade. If,
as opponents of ADR suggest, this tax saving is not used for additional
capital investment, it will be a considerable windfall to corporations,
perhaps distributed to stockholders in the form of dividends.'" Fur-
thermore, because stockholders tend to be in higher income brackets,'"
a high percentage of their dividends would be saved, rather than con-
sumed, since they need only spend a small portion of their income in
order to cover needs.'" Conversely, the lower-income individual con-
sumes a much greater percentage of his income. If the tax reduction
effected by ADR were to be distributed to the individual instead of the
148 117 Cong. Rec. E4563 (daily ed. May 18, 1971).
148 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(1)(iv) (1971).
150 117 Cong. Rec. E4563 (daily ed. May 18, 1971).




154 P. Samuelson, supra note 136, at 210.
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corporation, consumer demand might be greatly increased!" Such a
distribution could be achieved by increasing the personal exemption by
WO,'" or by lowering the taxes of those in the lower brackets.'"
CONCLUSION
The Asset Depreciation Range radically alters the concept of use-
ful life in the determination of depreciation. Although the issue of the
Treasury Department's authority to effect this change has been mooted
by the Revenue Act of 1971, the question remains whether ADR
represents effective tax policy. The accelerative effects produced by
ADR's salvage value, repair and retirement provisions, as well as its
twenty percent reduction in useful lives, will cost the government over
thirty-five billion dollars during the next decade. Even conceding that
the ADR System will act to stimulate the national economy, it is sub-
mitted that the billions of dollars of benefits it confers will be dis-
tributed disproportionately. Small businesses will be discriminated
against in favor of large ones because of the marginal rate effect pro-
duced by the increased deductions. It is submitted that the investment
tax credit procedure reenacted by the Revenue Act of 1971 is a much
more equitable and efficient business incentive than ADR since its
benefits are restricted to actual investments and do not become a
function of the taxpayer's marginal rate. If the seven percent tax credit
alone cannot produce the results projected by ADR, then it is sug-
gested that the credit be increased to meet this need. This increase
would obviate the necessity for the ADR System, which can only
produce unnecessary duplication resulting in inequity and wasteful tax
expenditures.
DAVID A. KAPLAN
155 117 Cong. Rec. E4564 (daily ed. May 18, 1971).
150 117 Cong. Rec. E3401 (daily ed. April 23, 1971) (statement of Congressman
Carman). The Revenue Act of 1971 does raise the personal exemption from $650 to $675
151(b)). The purpose behind allowing a deduction for personal exemptions is to
avoid taxing persons with income below a subsistence level who, consequently, do
not have the capacity to pay taxes. However, the dollar amount of the personal exemp-
tion has been far below minimum subsistence levels. For this reason Congress enacted
§ 141(c), which provides a low income allowance to aid poverty level persons. Even so,
the increase in personal exemptions provided by § 151(b) and the low income allowance
under § 141(c) are still inadequate and fall short of the poverty level for families of
various sizes. S. Surrey, W. Warren, P. McDaniel & H. Ault, Federal Income Taxation,
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